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Capital markets are more and more integrated but remain partially separated. To speed up 
integration, help absorb asymmetric shocks and thus reduce the need for government support in 
times of crises, the creation of a Capital Market Union in the EU has been suggested. This policy 
brief discusses long run consequences of perfectly integrated capital markets, ignoring crises but 
taking population ageing into account. Recent research shows that redistribution would take 
place, from fast ageing to slow ageing countries, because investors seek access to the largest 
labour markets, delivering higher returns on investments. The GDP per capita could be more than 
2 %-points lower in some countries and 2 %-points higher in other countries, compared to autarky. 
The redistribution pattern depends on social security reforms: some countries would lose from 
capital markets integration without any reforms but would gain if the retirement age was 
increased. 
The subprime and sovereign debt crises have led to changes in the economic governance of the 
European Union and to a large number of proposals for further policy reform. Taking stock of the 
policy debate, the European Commission makes two concrete recommendations and suggests 
further evaluation of a number of other reform proposals (European Commission, 2017). The first 
recommendation is to complete the Banking Union by implementing its last pillar. The second 
recommendation is to start the implementation of a Capital Market Union (CMU).  
Capital markets are becoming increasingly integrated in the European Union, ahead of product 
markets and far ahead of labour markets (Lane, 2006). Capital markets remain however partially 
separated along country lines (e.g. Morelli, 2010), which contributes to asymmetric economic 
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developments within the European Union, in particular during crises. By improving the cross-country 
distribution of economic shocks, the CMU should speed up the integration of capital markets and 
thus help the European Union to be more resilient as a whole and reduce the need for government 
support in times of crises
2
. 
There are however diverging long run trends across European Union countries, most notably with 
regard to the demography. Fertility rates, for instance, differ markedly within the European Union, 
ranging from 1.31 in Portugal to 1.96 in France in 2015. Population ageing is thus expected to differ 
across countries over the next decades. Taking these trends into account, what would be the 
consequences of the implementation of a CMU? This policy brief summarizes recent research at the 
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) which seeks an answer to this question. The research focuses on 
long run demographic trends, a subset of European Union countries and macroeconomic impacts, 
where GDP is the key indicator. It is a complement to previous analyses, which discussed in 
particular the important short-run stabilization properties of the CMU.  
Using a multi-country computable general equilibrium model and assuming that migration and 
demographic projections are unaffected by either the CMU or economic reforms, two cases are 
compared. In the first case, countries are assumed to be isolated, closed economies. In particular, 
capital markets are assumed to be separated. In the second case, countries are assumed to be 
connected through perfectly integrated capital markets, as would take place after full 
implementation of the CMU. Comparing population ageing impacts in these two cases provides an 
assessment of the long run consequences of the CMU
3
. 
 
1. The impact of population ageing with the CMU 
Figure 1 shows the simulated impacts of population ageing on GDP per capita in two countries, 
France and Germany, over the next 50 years. The impact in the closed economy case is shown by the 
dashed line while the impact with integrated capital markets is shown by the solid line. When social 
security is not reformed, population ageing increases old-age social security expenditures (pensions, 
health and long-term care). To avoid an explosion of public debt, labour income taxes are increased 
in all cases to keep public debt constant. 
 
 
Source: Davoine (2017). 
Figure 1. Simulation results, population ageing, no social security reform 
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Consistent with the public finance literature, Figure 1 shows that population ageing leads to a 
decline in GDP per capita over the long run without any reform
4
. With constant retirement age and 
increasing life expectancy, labour supply per capita and thus production per capita drop. The novelty 
is the comparison of the two cases, closed economy and integrated capital markets (dashed and 
solid lines). The Figure shows that the drop of GDP per capita would be higher with integrated 
capital markets in Germany, but lower in France. On average, the CMU would lead to a 2.9 %-points 
loss of GDP per capita in each of the next 50 years in Germany, but a 2.1 %-points gain in France.  
Table 1 provides the corresponding numbers for all 14 European Union countries in our sample and 
shows that the largest gain is in France, at 2.1 %-points, and the largest loss in the Netherlands, at 
4.8 %-points. Absent any social security reforms and using labour income taxes to prevent increases 
of public debts, the simulation thus shows that the CMU would lead to redistribution across 
countries over the long run. Since the weighted average (by economic size) of gains and losses is 
near zero, the CMU would not lead to any aggregate efficiency gains over the long run (measured in 
GDP terms).  
 
Legend: Closed is the case with no capital market integration (single, closed economy); CMU is the case of a 
Capital Market Union with perfect capital market integration; Gap is the %-points difference in GDP/capita 
variations between the Closed case and the CMU case. Source: Davoine (2017). 
Table 1. Summary simulation results, population ageing, no social security reform 
The main reason for the cross-country redistribution impact of the CMU are demographic 
differences. Figure 2 illustrates these differences, showing the old-age dependency ratios
5
 in 2015 
and their projected values in 2065. The ratio would for instance increase from 35% to 60% in 
Germany, but only from 30% to 47% in France. Relative to other countries, labour supply per capita 
is thus projected to drop faster in Germany, which would increase the capital-labour ratio faster and 
decrease returns to investment more. The opposite would take place in France. In the integrated 
capital markets case, investors would shift their investments away from Germany and towards 
France, reducing the capital stock and production in Germany and increasing them in France. Ceteris 
paribus, there is thus an investment dividend from slow population ageing in the scenario of 
integrated capital markets. Other reasons for cross-country redistribution are institutions, which will 
be discussed next. 
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 GDP/capita change (%)   GDP/capita change (%) 
Average 2015-2065  Average 2015-2065 
Closed CMU Gap  Closed CMU Gap 
Austria -8.1 -8.1 0.0  Italy -5.9 -4.6 +1.3 
Belgium -3.6 -4.9 -1.3  Netherlands -3.1 -7.9 -4.8 
Czech Republic -6.0 -7.6 -1.6  Poland -7.4 -9.0 -1.6 
Denmark -3.8 -6.0 -2.2  Slovakia -7.8 -8.9 -1.1 
Finland -3.4 -2.6 +0.8  Spain -4.3 -5.3 -1.0 
France -4.9 -2.8 +2.1  Sweden -4.5 -4.2 +0.3 
Germany -1.2 -4.1 -2.9  United Kingdom -7.1 -5.7 +1.4 
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Source: Eurostat (2015). 
Figure 2. Old-age dependency ratio, 2015 and 2065 
 
2.  The role of social security reforms 
Table 2 provides the simulated long-run outcomes of population ageing in the two cases, closed 
economies or integrated capital markets, when the same social security reform is implemented in all 
countries. Specifically, the retirement age is gradually increased by 2.5 years over the next five 
decades
6
. This reform increases social security contributions and reduces expenditures, as 
households work longer and collect pensions later. The reform may however not be sufficient to 
balance the social security system. As before, labour income taxes are increased as needed to keep 
public debts constant. 
 
Legend: see Table 1. Source: Davoine (2017). 
Table 2. Summary simulation results, population ageing, retirement age increase 
As in Table 1, Table 2 exhibits a redistribution effect due to the CMU. On average, for instance, GDP 
per capita would be 2.9 %-points lower in Germany in each of the next 50 years and 2.7 %-points 
higher in France if capital markets were perfectly integrated. Again, the weighted average of gains 
and losses is near zero. Compared to Table 1, redistribution patterns however differ in Table 2. 
While Belgium, for instance, would incur an average yearly loss of 1.3 %-points without any reform 
(Table 1), it would benefit from an average yearly gain of 1.8 %-points with the social security reform 
(Table 2). 
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 GDP/capita change (%)   GDP/capita change (%) 
Average 2015-2065  Average 2015-2065 
Closed CMU Gap  Closed CMU Gap 
Austria -3.9 -2.6 +1.3  Italy -1.6  1.5 +3.1 
Belgium -1.2  0.6 +1.8  Netherlands  1.1 -2.7 -3.8 
Czech Republic -2.5 -3.1 -0.6  Poland -2.0 -3.6 -1.6 
Denmark -0.9 -0.1 +0.8  Slovakia -3.6 -4.6 -1.0 
Finland  1.0  1.7 +0.7  Spain  1.5  0.6 -0.9 
France  0.2  2.9 +2.7  Sweden  0.2  1.5 +1.3 
Germany  4.0  1.1 -2.9  United Kingdom -3.1 -2.0 +1.1 
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The main reason for such a change in redistribution patterns are institutions. Compared to other 
countries, the population is projected to age slower in Belgium, but labour income taxes and social 
security contributions are higher than in other countries. Without the social security reform, labour 
income tax rates need to be strongly increased to keep public debt constant, leading to stronger 
labour supply disincentives in that country (Laffer curve effect). This leads to a stronger increase in 
the capital-labour ratio, decreasing the returns to investment more and triggering capital outflows. 
With the social security reform, taxes do not need to be increased as much. The slow-ageing effect 
then dominates, increasing the capital-labour ratio less and decreasing returns to investment less 
than in other countries, which attracts capital from abroad. 
 
3. General policy implications 
The simulations presented above and in the rest of the research project (see Davoine, 2017) show 
that the CMU would, over the long run, lead to cross-country spillovers and would create winners 
and losers. Ceteris paribus, countries whose population ages faster would lose, while countries with 
a slow ageing population would gain from the CMU.  
The simulations also demonstrate the role of social security reforms. Disregarding international 
spillover effects, it is well known that reforms are needed to deal with increasing old-age social 
security expenditures as the population ages, if the objective is to avoid a decline in economic 
growth: countries which fail to implement social security reform would have to pay a 
macroeconomic penalty. The research shows that this penalty would be higher with the CMU. 
Relying on the government general budget instead of reforming social security indeed is likely to 
reduce labour supply incentives, reducing returns to investment and thus triggering a capital 
outflow. 
The research further provides information on the respective merits of various social security reform 
options. The three standard pension reform options are increases in social security contributions, 
pension benefit reductions and increases in retirement age. Each option has advantages and 
disadvantages. The CMU would provide one more advantage to the third option, increases in 
retirement age. Indeed, this option has a beneficial impact on the capital-labour ratio, increasing 
returns to investment and attracting capital from abroad. 
Capital markets are not yet completely integrated. Simulations presented above show that cross-
country redistribution patterns depend on the implementation (or not) of social security reforms. 
Countries which want to coordinate and tackle jointly the redistribution effects of population ageing 
should thus discuss social security reforms and deeper capital market integration (i.e. the CMU) at 
the same time. From a macroeconomic point of view, however, the research has not identified any 
efficiency gains: the cases considered are all zero-sum games, as those countries which gain only 
gain because they attract capital away from other countries, which, as a result, lose from the CMU
7
.  
An important assumption of the analysis presented above is that demographic projections are 
neither influenced by the CMU nor by economic policy reforms. In reality, migration partially 
depends on differences in economic conditions between the origin and the destination countries. In 
a fast ageing country, wages should increase faster, as the labour supply per capita drops faster and 
the capital-labour ratio increases faster. Over time, fast ageing countries may become a more 
interesting immigration destination, which would slow down the ageing of the population and the 
negative impacts of the CMU. Pro-immigration policies are thus one way to mitigate the negative 
consequences of the CMU in fast ageing countries.  
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In related fashion, and as final words of caution, one should note that the assumption of stable 
demographic projections is, to some extent, unrealistic. Migration is indeed free within the 
European Union, so that within-EU migration should naturally mitigate the long run impacts of the 
CMU presented in this policy brief. To what extent the real impact of the CMU will be lower is, 
however, unknown, which should guard against unfounded optimism. One can also note that capital 
market integration is a process which does not only depend on policy; even without a CMU, the 
integration process may continue. The results presented here also apply without an explicit CMU 
goal. 
 
4. Specific policy implications for Austria and several other countries 
In the absence of social security reforms, Austria would neither lose nor gain from the CMU over the 
long run (see Table 1). However, the country would gain in case of reforms (see Table 2). Similar 
patterns hold for a few other countries. Belgium and Denmark, for instance, would lose from the 
CMU without reforms, but would gain with reforms. The Czech Republic and the Netherlands would 
lose in both cases, but lose less in case of reforms, while Italy and Sweden would gain in both cases, 
but gain even more in case of reforms. For all these countries, the GDP per capita gains from 
implementing the reform is a yearly average of 1 %-point or more over each of the next 50 years. 
For Austria and the other six countries, the implementation of social security reforms – in this case, 
an increase of the retirement age – thus plays a crucial role in maximizing the benefit one can gain 
from the CMU (or reduce the losses it generates). For the other countries in our sample, the 
implementation of the reforms makes no or less of a difference.  
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